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Introduction 
The emergence of Asia as a global electronics manufacturing base is one of the few 
success stories of Third World industrialization. Within a relatively short period, 
basically the last three decades of the late 20
th century, a progressive integration into 
global production networks, dominated by global corporations (the “network flagships”), 
has produced a rapid expansion of Asia’s production capacity and exports for mass-
produced commodity-type electronics products (Ernst, 1997; Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998). 
By creating jobs and foreign currency, this strategy has provided “pathways from the 
periphery”(Haggard, 1990).  
 
These achievements are now history. They are impressive, but no longer sufficient to 
generate sustained economic growth. Today, Asia’s leading electronics exporting 
countries are all attempting to move beyond export-led industrialization. By upgrading to 
higher value-added and knowledge-intensive products, services and processes, they are 
aggressively exploring diverse pathways to innovation. What explains this shift in 
strategy? How serious are these upgrading efforts? Are these just words, like a few times 
before during earlier periodic downturns? Or are things different this time? Will R&D 
and other knowledge-intensive services follow the earlier migration of manufacturing to 
Asia? 
 
There is little research available that could provide guidance to attempts to answer this 
question. The study of research policies and innovation systems explores how specific 
policies and institutional arrangements influence the decisions of firms to develop, 
commercialize, or adopt new technologies (Mowery, 1994; Freeman and Soete, 1997) 
and to develop innovative capabilities required to implement these decisions (Pavitt, 
1999). However, both theoretical and empirical work is focused overwhelmingly on the 
leading industrialized economies and their most dynamic innovation clusters. Very few 
studies address these issues for Asian countries. In addition, empirical research on 
innovation in Asian countries tends to look back, fighting the old battles about whether 
markets, governments or foreign investment are the main causes of earlier successes
1.  
 
This paper looks ahead. It argues that Asian pathways to innovation are shaped by the 
tension between three conflicting determinants. First, a consensus is emerging that there 
is no alternative to innovation, as traditional export-led industrialization strategies are 
insufficient to cope with new challenges. Second, there is a widespread fear that a US-
centric concentration of economic power and of the sources of innovation may constrain, 
if not foreclose Asia’s attempts to move from upgrading its manufacturing capabilities to 
upgrading its innovative capabilities. And third, and somewhat paradoxically, there are 
signs that constraints to the exchange of knowledge are gradually declining in the “global 
network economy”, broadening the sources of knowledge that Asian economies can 
access and exploit to foster their innovation strategies. 
 
                                                           
1 Paraphrasing the late Keith Pavitt (1999), this reflects a bias in academic research: it is a professionally 
safe option to test established theories. 
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This argument will be developed as follows. Part one presents data for Asia’s five 
leading electronics exporting countries (China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia) that 
highlight their evolving integration in the global electronics industry’s production, 
markets and exports. Part two explores new challenges that have induced these countries 
to explore pathways to innovation. Improved innovative capabilities are widely seen to 
be required to cope with decreasing returns of export-led industrialization, and to cope 
with the impact of external shocks that appear to gain in frequency and destructive 
power. Innovation is also considered to be essential to cope with two important changes 
in Asia’s economic power structure: Japan’s declining role as a regional economic 
hegemon, and China’s new role as a major market and manufacturing base for 
increasingly sophisticated industrial products, and as a priority investment target for 
global industry leaders. 
 
Part three examines opportunities for Asian innovation strategies that may result from the 
new mobility of knowledge in the emerging global network economy. I explore how the 
traditional boundaries between manufacturing and innovation are blurred by a 
combination of three inter-related transformations that encompass the emerging “global 
network economy”(Ernst, 2003, Christensen book): 
 
•  vertical specialization (“outsourcing” in industry parlance) no longer is restricted to 
production (of goods and services), but covers all stages of the value chain, including 
R&D and new product development; 
•  the reintegration of geographically dispersed specialized supply bases into multi-
layered “global networks of networks” that encompass production, supply chain 
management as well as product development and design; 
•  and the increasing use of digital information systems (DIS) to manage these diverse 
networks to enhance not only information exchange, but also the sharing and joint 
creation of knowledge. 
 
Part four finally examines diverse upgrading strategies, developed in Asia’s five leading 
electronics exporting countries in response to the above challenges and opportunities. 
The paper concludes with generic policy suggestions. 
 
1. Asia’s Global Network Integration 
(incomplete, to be revised) 
A progressive integration of Asiaґs electronics industries into global production networks 
(GPNs) provides a fascinating example of the benefits that Asian firms can reap from 
linkages with foreign firms (e.g., Borrus, Ernst, Haggard, 2000; Ernst, 2000, Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management). Network participation has provided Asian producers with 
access to the industry’s main growth markets, helping to compensate for the initially 
small size of their domestic markets. It also provided new employment opportunities, and 
induced Asian network suppliers to develop primarily operational technological and 
management capabilities (Ernst and Kim, 2002).  
 
(To follow: 1 para on the historic development of GPNs in Asia: Japan, US, etc.) 
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Government policies have fostered this integration into GPNs and have provided 
incentives, financial resources and public goods that have enabled local firms to reap the 
benefits of network participation. As a result, East Asia has emerged as the dominant 
global manufacturing base of the electronics industry, especially for assembly and 
component manufacturing. 
 
Share of production, markets and exports 
 




Together, our five countries account for one quarter of world electronics production, but 
only about 16% or so of the global electronics market.   
 
Imbalance between production and demand, with the exception of China →→  export 
platform production 
 
BUT, the share of our five countries in the global electronics market is increasing 
•  recession in the US, Europe, and Japan  
IBM: 21% of its sales revenues originate in Asia; Motorola > 15% 
 
•  lead user markets for telecommunications services & equipment (especially, Korea, 
China, Singapore)  
Korea, Singapore: test-bedding 
China: biggest market for telecommunications equipment (wired & wireless) 
 
•  sophisticated government procurement markets (singapore, Korea, China) 




As usual, too much aggregation can mislead. Once we look at major product markets, the 
share of our five countries is substantially higher: 
•  CE (China, Korea), especially for digital AV equipment and mobile phone 
•  computers & peripherals (Taiwan, china) 
•  HDDs ( Singapore triangle) 
•   communications ( Korea, Taiwan, China)  
•  Most precision component manufacturing has moved to Asia. 
 
Take semiconductors.   
 
Table 2 Wafer Fabrication Moves to Asia-Pacific  
(Quote latest figures from VLSI Research, in: Semiconductor Reporter) 
 
                                                           
2 Annex contains all tables and figures 
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AP’s share of worldwide foundry capacity, 2001: > 80% 




 Korea’s dominant position in computer memories, flat-panel displays and in CDMA-
based mobile phones is well known. … 
 
Taiwan ranks as the #1 global world market supplier (2001) for 14 electronics products 
(Table 3: Taiwan’s Top Electronics Products (2001): ranking No.1) That list includes 
for instance silicon foundry services (73% share in global production value), the 
provision of IC packaging and testing services (30.4%), notebook PCs (24%), and LCD 
monitors (41.1%). Equally important is that Taiwanese firms are market leaders in 
emerging growth markets related to wireless communication devices, leading the 
emerging market for wireless LAN (=local area networks, or WiFi). Taiwanese firms also 
are market leaders for digital AV equipment like CD-ROM disks and DVD disks, with 
much of these devices produced in low-cost locations in China. In addition, Taiwan ranks 
as the #1 global world market supplier for motherboards (1/3 of world exports), behind 
Intel; and the #3 provider in flat-panel displays (23 % share in global production value). 
 
China is now # 3 worldwide, in terms of both electronics production and its market for 
electronics products. This represents a dramatic growth, compared to only a few years 
ago. Over the last few years, China has also become Asia’s leading electronics exporting 
country
3. Note however that roughly 60% of China’s electronics exports originate from 
factories owned by Taiwanese companies. This figure indicates a dirty little secret of the 
global network economy: things are no longer as simple as we economists like to assume, 
with trade flows neatly identifiable with specific countries
4.  
 
Estimate on export ranking order: 
China (#3), Korea (#4), Taiwan (#5, slightly behind), Singapore (#7, behind Ireland, but 
before Mexico), Malaysia (#9). 
 
Table 4: Asian Trade Specialization Profiles: RCA and Leading Export Products, 
1993 - 1998 





2. New Challenges 
                                                           
3 The share of technology-intensive products ( primarily electronics) in China’s global exports has 
increased dramatically from 3% in 1985 to22% in 2000, making China the largest exporter of  such 
products in the developing world (UNCTAD, 2003) 
4 An early empirical analysis  of the impact of GPNs on trade patterns in Asia’s electronics industry can be 
found in  Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998. 
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This section highlights new challenges that have induced Asiaґs leading electronics 
exporting countries to attempt to upgrade its manufacturing as well as its innovative 
capabilities. These efforts are very serious. There are of course powerful incentives to 
pursue upgrading strategies: A company can reap vastly superior profit margins, the 
higher it moves up on the ladder to innovation (see Table Innovation and Profits). But 
these incentives have to be balanced against the cost of upgrading. Moving up to more 
complex and knowledge-intensive activities requires concerted efforts and massive 
investments to improve skills and innovative capabilities on the level of the firm, as well 
as significant improvements in industry-specific, regional and national production and 
innovation systems. 
 
Nevertheless, there are powerful pressures to proceed with upgrading efforts. There is a 
growing recognition that there are simply no alternatives to innovation, as traditional 
strategies are insufficient to cope with four new challenges: the decreasing returns of 
export-led industrialization, the increase in the frequency and destructive power of 
external shocks, the dual shift in Asia’s economic power structure, and a US-centric 
concentration of economic power and of the sources of innovation. 
 
2.1. Decreasing returns to export-led industrialization  
A consensus is emerging in Asia’s successful exporting countries that improved 
innovative capabilities are required to cope with decreasing returns of export-led 
industrialization, and to cope with the impact of external shocks that appear to gain in 
frequency and destructive power. There is a widespread perception that export-led 
industrialization, based on integration into global production networks (GPNs), produces 
rapidly decreasing returns. Of particular concern is a declining capacity for employment 
generation. While after earlier downturns a substantial share of laid-off workers were re-
hired, this no longer seems to be the case. In Malaysia’s electronics industry, for instance, 
an estimated 150,000 to 165,000 jobs have been lost since the financial crisis (Ernst, 
2003, in World Bank book, OUP). In Penang, almost two third of the retrenched workers 
in the electronics industry (ca. 16,000, primarily low-skilled, female production workers), 
have left the labor market, indicating a massive return of Malay females (in the 25-29 age 
range) to their villages (Too and Leng, 2002). And in Singapore, the share of 
employment in the electronics industry out of total employment has declined from 28% 
(1992) to 19% in 2002. 
 
Another proxy for decreasing returns is a disturbing slow-down in productivity growth. 
In Penang, for instance, total factor productivity (TFP) of manufacturing declined by - 
0.5 % between 1995 and 1997, compared to an increase of 8.9% between 1990 to 1995 
(State Government of Penang, 2001). In the electronics industry, TFP growth fell to 2% 
(from 14.1% during the earlier period) - hardly sufficient for an industry that is supposed 
to be the engine of upgrading
5.  
                                                           
5 As for TFP growth for all of Malaysia, most estimates put it around 1 to 2 % p.a. (until 2000). This is way 
below the minimum TFP growth projected by the government of 3.2% (for the period 2001 to 2010), 
which is necessary, if Malaysia wants to achieve the projected growth rate of 7.5%. Compared with 
historical growth patterns of productivity in industrialized countries, such a massive slow-down in TFP 
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(To follow: more indicators on declining employment generation capabilities; slow-down 
of productivity growth; closing-down of factories by global brand leaders; footloose 
investment; limited local spill-overs, once global contract manufacturers take over 
factories from global brand leaders..) 
 
2.2. External shocks 
The perception of decreasing returns has been strengthened by recent external shocks like 
the financial crisis, recession, geo-political conflicts, and war
6. Those shocks are man-
made, and are an intrinsic element of globalization: they appear to gain in frequency and 
destructive power. We define “globalization” as the integration, across borders, of 
markets for capital, goods, services, knowledge, and labor (Ernst, 2003, in Sassen book, 
Princeton). Barriers to integration continue to exist of course in each of these different 
markets (especially for low-wage labor), so integration is far from perfect. But there is no 
doubt that a massive integration has taken place across borders that, only a short while 
ago, seemed to be impenetrable. This has increased the synchronization of economic 
activities, including that of financial crises and recessions. For instance, 82 financial 
crises have occurred worldwide between 1970 and 1996 (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998), 
indicating that little is exceptional about the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and that such 
crises may well re-occur.. 
 
In addition, Asia’s rapid export-led industrialization is also exposed to natural shocks, 
due to environmental degradation and earthquakes. For instance, much of the production 
of key IT components (semiconductors, displays, storage devices) critically depends on 
uninterrupted access to filtered, ultra-pure water
7. Taiwan is currently hit by one of the 
worst droughts in decades, yet its wafer fab cluster in Hsinchu, the largest worldwide (15 
fabs producing $8.2billion worth of chips, i.e. 7% of the world's total) require 
uninterrupted water supply: each wafer fab roughly consumes up to 3 million gallons of 
ultra-pure water per day. Singapore, which heavily depends on water supply from 
Malaysia is periodically faced with similar emergencies. And Taiwan’s earthquake on 
September 21, 1999, with a magnitude of 7.6 on the Richter scale, had a devastating 
effect on the global supply chain of semiconductors. Losses incurred by the wafer fabs in 
Hsinchu science park were estimated at about $ 1 billion, primarily due to the disruption 
of electric power supply.  Electronics factories, and especially semiconductor fabrication 
lines, are extremely sensitive to power fluctuations, let alone full-scale blackouts lasting 
for days. At that time, Taiwanese wafer fabs accounted for more than 12 % of global 
fabrication capacity, which indicates how vulnerable to such disruptions the global 
semiconductor industry has become. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
growth is certainly premature, in light of the thus far still limited progress in Malaysia’s specialization by 
product and production stage. 
6 In the specialized literature on global supply chain management in Asia , a number of books and articles 
examine in quite some detail the disruptive potential of geo-poltical conflicts like the cross-Strait relations 
between China and Taiwan, the Korean conflict, the “war on terrorism” in Asia, and the impact of piracy 
on sea-borne trade in Southeast Asia. 
7 See the East-West-Center’s new project on “Dirty Silicon - Developing Environmentally Friendly 
Information Technology Production Clusters in Asia”. 
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Each of these shocks threatens to disrupt the region’s integration into GPNs. Asia’s 
globally integrated industrial clusters pay a high price for such disruptions: declining 
exports, excess capacity and price wars have periodically squeezed profit margins of 
Asian exporting firms. In many cases, this has led to a vicious circle of declining 
investment, down-sizing and mass lay-offs. More recently, the SARS epidemic has added 
further to this perception that something needs to change, and that innovation needs to 
complement industrial volume manufacturing to generate sustained economic 
development.  
 
2.3. Asia’s changing economic power structure 
In addition, two important changes have occurred in Asia’s economic power structure 
that are affecting the parameters of Asian development strategies: the erosion of Japan’s 
role as the regional economic hegemon, and the ascent of China. 
 
a) Japan’s changing role 
First, there is a widespread perception that Japan’s role as the regional economic 
hegemon shows signs of decline. Asia now depends considerably less on Japan as a 
provider of capital, key technologies and development models, and this is true as well for 
the electronics industry. Hamilton-Hart (forthcoming) documents the withdrawal of 
Japanese corporate capital from Asia after 1997
8. And Ernst (forthcoming) examines how 
the at least partial adaptation of Japanese production networks in Asia to the American 
model of IT-enabled outsourcing and share-holder capitalism has discredited the 
traditional Japanese development model with its focus on integrated hardware 
manufacturing. 
 
However, one should obviously not exaggerate the decline of Japan’s role for Asian 
electronics industries. Especially in electronics, Japanese firms continue to move their 
production facilities out of Japan, primarily to China, while maintaining operations in 
Southeast Asia
9. Japanese firms also remain a major source of components and 
machinery for Asian electronics industries, but their share in such imports appears to 
be declining (check with JETRO, 2003). What matters is that important changes are 
occurring in the way Japanese firms organize their Asian production networks, and that 
this may change the parameters for Asian upgrading strategies in the electronics industry. 
 
                                                           
8 This argument is based on Ministry of Finance data that do not include the quite substantial amounts of 
reinvestments of Japanese affiliates in Asia that take place without a capital transfer from Japan to the 
region. Earlier research by JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation), the former Ex-IM Bank of  
Japan, and especially work by Shigeki Tejima demonstrates that, until around 2000, the declining FDI 
outflows from Japan to Asia reflected the relatively strong financial performance of Japanese affiliates 
especially in cars and electronic components. This has enabled local affiliates to increase reinvestments out 
of locally generated profits. It is unclear whether this is still the case. 
9 JETRO data for the first half of 2002 show Japanese outward manufacturing FDI to East Asia has 
increased by 3.8%, to the ASEAN4 by 15.7% (first increase since 1998), and to China by 44.8%. The large 
electronics conglomerates like Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC are attempting to rationalize their over-lapping 
Southeast Asian and China-related networks, consolidating large export platform mega-plants in one 
location. A typical example is Toshiba’s new mammoth integrated production complex in Shanghai.  
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In the semiconductor industry, Japanese firms have started already in the mid-1990s to 
develop outsourcing arrangements and strategic alliances with Taiwanese firms (Ernst 
and Ravenhill, 1999). They are investing in R&D centers, both in China and Southeast 
Asia, where the focus now shifts from product customization and process adjustment to 
IC design and software services. Moreover, Japanese firms continue to play important 
role as a provider of management techniques for Asian suppliers
10.  
 
b) China’s ascent 
A second important transformation of Asia’s economic geography in the electronics 
industry is the new role played by China. Until the mid-1990s, four first-tier NIEs 
(Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), and two second-tier NIEs (Malaysia and 
Thailand), were considered to be the standard bearers of the so-called “East Asian 
Miracle”. That changed however, once China emerged as a major market and 
manufacturing base for increasingly sophisticated industrial products. China’s inward 
FDI during the first 10 months of 2002 was $ 46.4 billion (UNCTAD, 2003). Even if one 
assumes that “round-tripping”
11 constitutes 35% of inward FDI, China’s actual FDI 
inflows would be $32 billion. This would still represent 80% of all FDI inflows to Asia, 
excluding Japan. This new wave of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
consequent integration into GPNs of new clusters in South and East China has generated 
fears of trade and investment diversion in the rest of Asia.  
 
A vast pool of cheap labor allows China to continue to compete as a low-cost 
manufacturing base
12. At the same time, however, China is distinguished by a broad base 
of accumulated capabilities in R&D, developed in the Chinese Academy of Science and 
related institutions, and in the defense sector. It would thus be a great mistake to view 
China only as the cheap-labor workshop for the global electronics industry. China’s new 
attractiveness results from a combination of five developments: a booming market for IT 
products and services, when the rest of the world is in recession; China’s unlimited 
supply of low-cost IT skills; abundant land and a rapidly improving infrastructure; a 
massive rush of capital flows into China; and, catching this opportunity, support policies 
pursued by the central government, as well as regional and local authorities to develop 
local capabilities and to rely on FDI as an accelerator of industrial upgrading. 
 
The share of foreign-invested affiliates in technology-intensive industries (primarily 
electronics) has risen from 59% in 1996 to 81% in 2000. In the electronics industry, 
leading global market leaders (whether from the US, Japan, Europe, or Korea), their 
global suppliers from Korea and Taiwan, and, more recently, the leading U.S. contract 
manufacturers have identified China as a priority investment target. The penetration of 
FDI is particularly pronounced in three sectors: electronic components (especially 
semiconductors), computers, and telecommunications. Until 1999, investment in Chinaґs 
                                                           
10 Among the many fascinating examples is Namtai… 
11 Actual inward FDI into China falls short of official estiamtes owing to the prevalence of “round 
tripping”: lower tax rates on foreign capital create an incentive for domestic entrepreneurs to move money 
offshore (e.g., to Hong Kong and the Virgin Islands) and introduce it as FDI. 
12 An estimate based on 2000 data indicates that broadly defined unemployment in China has reached 207 
million, or 29.1% of the total active population (Imai, 2002: p.33) 
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semiconductor industry lacked woefully behind similar investments in Korea and 
Taiwan. The turning point came in 2000. During that year, the Chinese government 
apparently made a strategic decision to rely on FDI to accelerate the development of this 
industry. Lavish tax and tariff incentives, and the prospect of a burgeoning market have 
induced global industry leaders from the US, Taiwan, and Japan to announce a battery of 
large investment projects worth around $ 15 to 20 billion. For US FDI in semiconductors, 
for instance, China has become the second most important recipient, after Singapore, 
overtaking Malaysia, which was the main recipient in 1996 (Malaysia Ministry of 
Finance data, quoted in Takeuchi, 2001).  
 
In computers, Taiwanese companies that supply global US brand leaders have played an 
important pioneering role in integrating China into GPNs. Since the early 1990s, they 
have continuously moved production from Taiwan to China. American global market 
leaders in computers and related peripheral equipment followed suit, in turn attracting a 
massive inflow of investments by US-owned global contract manufacturers (Ernst, 2003, 
World Bank book, OUP). The result is that “Greater China” (i.e. China plus Taiwan) 
today has become the predominant global supply base for computers. 
 
As for telecommunications and networking equipment, major global market leaders, like 
Motorola, Cisco, Nokia, Alcatel, Siemens, Ericsson, and Philips-Sony have all initiated 
significant new investment projects in China. Motorola for instance counts on continuous 
rapid growth of the China market to reduce the negative impact of the current recession. 
In 2000, China accounted for 12% of Motorola`s global sales, generating $ 4.5 billion of 
revenue. The company plans to double its China investment from $ 5 bn in 2001 to $ 
10bn in 2005, which would give rise to a massive expansion of manufacturing 
investment. But China is also expected to play an important role for Motorola’s long-
term strategy. By providing access to the world`s largest pool of relatively lower-cost IT 
skills, the company expects to enhance its innovation capabilities.  
 
In short, emergence of China as a new force in the global electronics industry poses a 
serious challenge for Asian electronics industries that continue to focus on volume 
manufacturing.  But the new challenge from China could also be a “blessing in disguise”, 
catalyzing for serious upgrading efforts. Furthermore, China’s huge potential market for 




2.4. Global concentration of economic resources 
As a result of the “New Economy” boom of the 1990s, “the world is more US-centric 
now than it has ever been” (Stephen Roach, chief economist of Morgan Stanley, at the 
World Economic Forum 2003). There is clear evidence that the concentration of 
economic power has substantially increased since the late 20
th century, first through 
mergers & acquisitions, fueled by the “New Economy” boom, and now through 
consolidation imposed by the recession. This has benefited primarily US corporations. In 
addition, the sources of innovation remain highly concentrated, centered primarily on the 
                                                           
13 Quote recent trade and investment data for Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia 
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U.S. Of global R&D, 86% takes place in industrialized countries, with the U.S. 
occupying the leading position with 37% (Dahlman and Aubert, 2001,p.34). The U.S. has 
raced ahead in the most prized areas of technological innovation, as far as these can be 
measured by patent statistics. The US “innovation score” measures the number of patents 
granted by the US Patent Office, multiplied by an index that indicates the value of these 
patents
14. Since 1985, the US “innovation score” has more than doubled, a rate far better 
than any other country (CHI Research, 2003). In 2002, all 15 leading companies with the 
best record on patent citations were based in the US, with nine of them in the IT sector 
(CHI/MIT 2003). 
 
Concentration in the electronics industry is high and keeps rising in important sectors 
(Ernst, 2002, IEBM: 326 and 327). In terms of market shares, both computer operating 
systems and microprocessors are each overwhelmingly dominated by one company, 
Microsoft and Intel respectively. Concentration is also substantial for high precision key 
components that are critical for architectural design and performance features, such as 
DRAM, advanced displays and hard disk drives. Concentration has also drastically 
increased in the PC industry, an industry which only a decade ago was hailed by neo-
liberals as a holy grail of free competition (Gilder 1988). The top two global market 
players –Dell and Hewlett Packard – have captured almost 70 per cent of PC unit growth 
worldwide. And as a result of the downturn in the global IT industry since late 2000, 
concentration has also dramatically increased in the global electronics manufacturing 
services industry, as well as for telecommunications and networking equipment. 
 
IT-based global networking practices have contributed to this growing concentration of 
control over critical economic resources (Ernst, 2002, forthcoming in Sassen book, 
Princeton). A GPN integrates diverse network participants who differ in their access to 
and in their position within such networks, and hence face very different opportunities 
and challenges. These networks do not necessarily give rise to less hierarchical forms of 
firm organization (as predicted for instance in Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, and in Nohria 
and Eccles, 1993). GPNs typically consist of various hierarchical layers, ranging from 
network flagships that dominate such networks, due to their capacity for system 
integration (Pavitt, 2002), down to a variety of usually smaller, local specialized network 
suppliers. 
 
By establishing hierarchical, flagship-dominated global production networks, a global 
brand leader (“system integrator”) can in principle expand his control over scarce 
resources and capabilities well beyond those resources and capabilities that, from an 
accounting perspective, lie directly under its management control. The strategy of the 
flagship company thus shapes the growth, the strategic direction and network position of 
lower-end participants, like specialized suppliers and subcontractors. The latter, in turn, “ 
have no reciprocal influence over the flagship strategy” (Rugman and DґCruz, 2000, 84). 
                                                           
14 The citation index measures the frequency of citation of a particular patent. When the US Patent Office 
publishes patents, each one includes a list of other patents from which it is derived. The more often a patent 
is cited, the more likely it is a pioneering patent, connected with important inventions and discoveries. An 
index of more than 1 indicates that patents are cited more often than would be expected for a specific group 
of technologies, while less than 1 indicates they are cited less often than expected (Narin, 2000) 
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The flagship derives its strength from its control over critical resources and capabilities 
that facilitate innovation, and from its capacity to coordinate transactions and knowledge 
exchange between the different network nodes.  
 
There are widespread fears that the spread of GPNs may constrain Asia’s attempts to 
move from upgrading its manufacturing capabilities to upgrading its innovative 
capabilities. However, as I will argue in the next section, the emerging global network 
economy will provide ample opportunities for new entrants in the global innovation race, 
despite the very high and increasing global concentration. This reflects an important 
puzzle of the global electronics industry: even when concentration is very high, this 
industry fails to act like a stable oligopoly, due to the rapid pace of change in technology 
and markets (Ernst, 2002, The International Encyclopedia of Business and Management (IEBM)). 
 
3. Opportunities: New Mobility of Knowledge in the Global Network Economy 
3.1. Asia’s Catching-up in innovation 
Despite the new challenges that are faced by Asian electronics industries, there are signs 
of a gradual strengthening of Asia’s position in the international division of knowledge 
creation. In a handful of emerging centers of excellence in Asia, sophisticated innovation 
and research capabilities appear to have followed the earlier development of 
manufacturing capabilities. Take the following illustrative examples.  
 
Chip design, a process that creates the greatest value in the electronics industry, has 
experienced a massive geographic dispersion to Asia: without Japan, the region’s  share 
in the global production of chip designs is projected to grow from around 30% in 2002 to 
more than 50% in 2008 (Ernst, 2003, Pavitt conference). Taiwan has emerged as a 
primary new location for chip design: five of the top 20 worldwide fabless companies are 
from Taiwan; and two Taiwanese design houses have moved up to the number 5 and 6 
spot, capturing 16% of total fabless revenues. Korea is following closely behind, with the 
chip design departments of Samsung, SK Telecom, KT, LG Telecom as the main drivers. 
The creation of commercial chip designs is also rapidly growing in China and India, as 
well as in Singapore and Malaysia. 
 
Patents, a widely used proxy for innovative capabilities, also indicate substantial 
progress. Take Taiwan, which did not show up in 1990 among the 10 top countries, in 
terms the number of patents granted in the US. Ten years later, in 2000, Taiwan was the 
fourth largest country (with 4,667 patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark 
Office), ahead of France and the UK, and Korea was # 8, ahead of Italy, Sweden and 
Switzerland. In the case of Taiwan, it has been argued that, despite this impressive 
quantitative performance, major weaknesses remain (Shang-Jyh Liu, 2001): there is a 
focus on gradual improvements of manufacturing processes, and most patents can only be 
used as tools for self-protection or cross-licensing. In terms of the CHI citation index, 
discussed above, Taiwan’s patents are not pioneering patents that are connected with 
important inventions and discoveries. 
 
But the use of patenting as a bargaining chip may actually not indicate a weakness. In the 
electronics industry, it may be a perfectly rational strategy. For that industry, a major 
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study, published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (Cohen, Nelson and 
Walsh, 2000: 24 and 26), indicated that, “the larger, more patent intensive firms are more 
likely to use …(patents)… to strengthen their positions as players in cross-licensing 
negotiations. …(T)he size and quality of a firm’s patent portfolio … affects the terms of 
trade between rival technologies and its own.” And Kingston (2001: 408) emphasizes 
that in the electronics industry it is an established practice to use patents as a “trading 
currency”. For Asian electronics that want to participate in the global innovation arms 
race (Baumol, 2002), it is necessary to develop broad-based patent portfolios to avoid 
being denied the use of critical inventions by global market leaders like Intel. 
 
During recent interviews with global electronics companies, I found a broad consensus 
that, in areas like digital consumer devices and mobile communications systems, the 
epicenter of innovation is likely to gradually move to Asia, especially greater China. 
There was also a widespread perception that this may include the definition of product 
and system standards. In consumer electronics, an example are joint efforts by China and 
Taiwan to develop a new video-disk technology format, called enhanced versatile disk 
(EVD) that would allow resolution five times higher than the current de facto industry 
standard DVD, while helping China’s consumer electronics industry to escape full 
royalty payments to the dominant DVD licensing groups
15. Beijing E-World Technology, 
a consortium of 10 Chinese DVD manufacturers, is conducting government-sponsored 
research, in collaboration with Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), 
and Taiwanese disk makers and chip design houses.  
 
In telecommunications, an important example are China’s attempt to develop an 
alternative third generation (3G) digital wireless standard, called TD-SCDMA (time-
division synchronous code-division multiple access)
16, for which it received approval by 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in August 2000. The standard was 
developed by Datang Telecom, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, and the Research 
Institute of the Ministry of Information Industry, with technical assistance from Siemens.  
To accelerate the implementation of this strategy, Datang has formed a series of 
collaborative agreements: a joint venture with Nokia, Texas Instruments, LG, and 
Taiwanese ODM suppliers (January 2002), a joint venture with Philips and Samsung 
(December 2002), and a licensing agreement with STMicroelectronics that will provide 
the Chinese company with access to critical design building blocks (Semiconductor 
Business News, January 17, 2003). 
 
Of course no serious observer would claim that Asia, or “Greater China” for that matter, 
will overtake the US, as well as Europe and Japan, as the global leading centers of 
innovation. We are observing an incremental process of change, but nevertheless an 
important one. It is no longer possible to take for granted Vernon’s assumption 
                                                           
15 Two major licensing groups dominate the DVD standard, and both charge substantial royalty fees: the 
DVD6C group (i.e., Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, JVC and AOL Time Warner), and the 3C 
group (Philips, Sony, and Pioneer). 
16 The two main competing 3G standards are W-CDMA (compatible with existing GSM operations, and 
supported by European firms), and CDMA 2000 (compatible with existing CDMA operations, and 
supported by US firms). 
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underlying his product life cycle theory that innovations necessarily emerge first in the 
US or Europe. It is now much more difficult to predict when and where innovations will 
occur. As observed in Yusuf (2003), innovations are springing up at an increasing 
number of locations - albeit in global terms the number of these locations is still limited. 
In some cases, Asia may actually be the source of innovations. In a few cases, it may also 
shape global standards.   
 
This surge in Asian innovative capabilities may actually be less surprising than it may 
look at first sight. It reflects the new mobility of knowledge in the emerging global 
network economy that is broadening the sources of knowledge that Asian economies can 
access. This new mobility of knowledge results from a combination of three inter-related 
transformations that are blurring the traditional boundaries between manufacturing and 
innovation (Ernst, forthcoming, Sassen book Princeton): 
 
•  vertical specialization (“outsourcing” in industry parlance) no longer is restricted to 
production (of goods and services), but covers all stages of the value chain, including 
R&D and new product development; 
•  the reintegration of geographically dispersed specialized supply bases into multi-
layered “global networks of networks” that encompass production, supply chain 
management as well as product development and design; 
•  and the increasing use of digital information systems (DIS) to manage these diverse 
networks to enhance not only information exchange, but also the sharing and joint 
creation of knowledge. 
 
3.2. Vertical specialization 
Vertical specialization is a powerful driver of the emerging global network economy. 
This reflects the growing complexity of competition, especially in knowledge-intensive 
industries like electronics (Ernst, 2002, The International Encyclopedia of Business and 
Management (IEBM)).  Intense price competition needs to be combined with product 
differentiation, while continuous price wars erode profit margins. Of critical importance, 
however, is speed-to-market: getting the right product to the largest volume segment of 
the market right on time can provide huge profits. Being late can be a disaster, and may 
even drive a firm out of business. The result has been an increasing uncertainty and 
volatility, and a destabilization of established market leadership positions.  
 
This growing complexity of competition has changed industrial and firm organization. 
No firm, not even a dominant market leader, can generate all the different capabilities 
internally that are necessary to cope with the requirements of global competition. 
Competitive success thus critically depends on vertical specialization: a capacity to 
selectively source specialized capabilities outside the firm. These capabilities can range 
from simple contract assembly to quite sophisticated design capabilities.  
 
The electronics industry has become the most important breeding ground for this new 
industrial organization model (Table 5: Vertical Specialization in Electronics 
Industry) Over the last decades, an erstwhile vertically integrated industry has been 
segmented into closely interacting horizontal layers (Grove, 1996). Until the early 1980s, 
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IBM personified ‘vertical integration’: almost all ingredients necessary to design, 
produce and commercialize computers remained internal to the firm. This was true for 
semiconductors, hardware, operating systems, application software, as well as sales and 
distribution.  
 
Since the mid-1980s, vertical specialization became the industry’s defining characteristic. 
An important initial catalyst of vertical specialization was the availability of standard 
components, which allowed for a change in computer design away from centralized (IBM 
mainframe) to decentralized architectures (PC, and PC-related networks). Most activities 
that characterized a computer company were now being farmed out to multiple layers of 
specialized suppliers, giving rise to rapid market segmentation and an ever finer 
specialization within each of the above five main value chain stages. This has culminated 
in the co-evolution of complex, globally organized product-specific value chains (for 
example, for microprocessors, memories, board assembly, PCs, networking equipment, 
operating systems, applications software, and sales & distribution). GPNs compete with 
each other in each of these value chains, but they may also cooperate. 
 
Vertical specialization has also fundamentally transformed the semiconductor industry 
(Table 6: Vertical Specialization: Semiconductor Industry, EWC talk). This industry 
consists of six main stages: system specification, process technology, design 
implementation, fabrication, packaging & testing; and materials & production equipment. 
Initially, all of these six stages took place in one firm, such as IBM (a captive 
semiconductor producer), or Intel (a so-called merchant firm). Innovation proceeded 
sequentially through collaboration among specialized divisions within the firm. Since the 
mid-1980s, vertical integration gave way to a process of progressive vertical 
specialization. This process has two dimensions: organization (a move from integration  
to disintegration) and location (a move from geographic concentration  to  dispersion). 
 
Certain activities have moved out to specialized suppliers (disintegration). Over time 
there has been a parallel process of geographic dispersion from the initial centers of 
excellence to new locations, with new suppliers emerging in Asia. The first stages to 
move to Asia were chip packaging and testing (Ernst, 1983), followed by certain aspects 
of design implementation (especially for ASIC design), and fabrication (memories and 
foundry services). This process of geographic dispersion has been accelerated over the 
last few years, especially for fabrication, but also for materials and manufacturing 
equipment, and for the development of process technology. As mentioned before, there 
are also now a few examples of system specification having moved to Asia. 
 
It is important to emphasize that vertical specialization applies as much to research and 
innovation as to manufacturing. Take IC design. Until the mid-1980s, IC producers did 
almost all their chip design in-house. The first step of vertical specialization was the 
separation of fabrication and design: the emergence of independent providers of pure-
play “silicon foundry” services gave rise to a proliferation of “fabless” design houses 
(like Altera) that focus on specific niche markets for integrated circuits (ICs).  
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More recently, a second stage of vertical specialization has occurred within the process of 
IC design itself. A primary driver has been a widening design productivity gap in ICs 
(see Figure 1: Widening Design Productivity Gap in Integrated Circuits). While the 
productivity of IC fabrication over the last twenty years has seen a 58% compounded 
annual growth, the productivity of chip design has dramatically lagged behind, with a 
21% compounded annual growth. As a result, the number of available transistors has 
grown faster than the ability to design them meaningfully. However, investment in 
process technology has by far outpaced investment in design technology. And, most 




Given this design productivity gap, differences in the cost of employing a chip design 
engineer have become an important determinant for decisions on where to locate IC 
design (Table 7: Annual Cost of Employing a Chip Design Engineer). In light of the 
fact that the annual cost of employing a chip design engineer in Asia is around 10 % of 
the cost in Silicon Valley, it is hardly surprising to find that chip design is being relocated 
to some of the leading IT clusters in the Asia-Pacific region that provide a skilled and re-
trainable workforce as well as easy access to foundry, assembly and testing services. In 
addition, radical changes in the methodology of chip design through the so-called 
system-on-chip (SOC) design
18 have arguably further enhanced the scope of vertical 
specialization within the process of design. Due to the growing complexity of the design 
process, a single company is no longer exclusively handling the design for a specific IC. 
Instead, many companies are contributing, based upon their specific areas of expertise. 
This leads to the development of global electronic design networks (GEDNs) that link 
together individual design houses, the licensors of specific design building blocks (the 
so-called “silicon intellectual properties”, SIPs), design service providers, foundries, 
design tool vendors, design departments of large electronics systems and brand name 
companies, etc that are all contributing to the complete IC design solution. 
 
Progressive vertical specialization may facilitate the implementation of innovation 
strategies in Asia. The dual process of organizational disintegration and geographic 
dispersion may open up new entry possibilities for specialized suppliers. Take again chip 
design. As global specialized suppliers proliferate across all stages of the semiconductor 
value chain, from assembly and test, to wafer fabrication, design tools, and different 
stages of design, this opens up new opportunities for Asian countries to develop their 
own chip design industries. Electronic design houses in country A can now rely on access 
to specialized silicon foundry suppliers in countries B and C, as well as on specialized 
suppliers of assembly & testing services in countries B, C, D, and E. Equally important, it 
is now possible for design houses in country A to gain “design-ins” with system 
                                                           
17 Design costs massively outpace the cost of chip manufacturing. Manufacturing costs for chips, the so-
called non-recurring engineering costs that cover masks and probe card, are reaching $ 1 million. However 
design-related NREs routinely reach tens of millions of dollars, with design shortfalls being responsible for 
massive corrections in fabrication that multiply manufacturing NRE (International Technology Roadmap 
for Semiconductors, 2001, p.81). 
18 (SOC) design integrates the traditional microprocessor, memories and peripherals - in other words the 
whole system - on a single piece of silicon. 
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companies that are located in large markets. As demonstrated above, significant new test-
bedding markets for digital consumer devices as well as mobile communications systems 
have emerged in Asian countries, especially Korea, Singapore and Greater China. 
 
3.3. Reintegration: global networks of networks 
But vertical specialization does not imply that the “Visible Hand” of large manufacturing 
firms will become invisible (as argued, for instance, in Langlois, 2001), giving rise to a 
resurgence of market forces. The necessary complement to vertical specialization, and the 
resultant geographic dispersion, are large global corporations (the network flagships) that 
can act as system integrators for the diverse, multi-layered global networks of networks 
that have evolved as a result of vertical specialization (see also Pavitt, 2002).  
 
A defining characteristic of the global network economy is the transition from vertically 
integrated ‘multinational corporations’ (MNCs), with their focus on stand-alone, equity-
controlled overseas investment projects, to flagship-dominated multi-layered “global 
networks of networks” that encompass production, supply chain management as well as 
product development and design. This contrasts with centuries of economic history where 
MNCs were the main drivers of international production (for example, Braudel, 1992; 
Wilkins, 1970). 
 
The concept of global production networks (GPNs) highlights two important dimensions: 
the transition from intra-firm to inter-firm transactions and forms of coordination, and the 
increasing scope of network activities (Figure 2: The Nodes of a Global Production 
Network).  A GPN links together the flagshipґs own subsidiaries, affiliates and joint 
ventures with its subcontractors, suppliers, service providers, as well as partners in 
strategic alliances (e.g., Ernst, 1997). These arrangements may, or may not involve 
ownership of equity stakes. A network flagship like IBM or Intel breaks down the value 
chain into a variety of discrete functions and locates them wherever they can be carried 
out most effectively, where they improve the firm’s access to resources and capabilities 
and where they are needed to facilitate the penetration of important growth markets. 
 
The main purpose of these networks is to provide the flagship with quick and low-cost 
access to resources, capabilities and knowledge that are complementary to its core 
competencies. In other words, transaction cost savings matter. Yet, the real benefits result 
from the dissemination, exchange and outsourcing of knowledge and complementary 
capabilities.  Figure 3 (Dell’s Global Production Network) illustrates the complex 
combinations of physical flows (including products and services) and information flows 
and knowledge exchange that bind together the participants of Dell’s GPN. The 
architecture of this network reflects the peculiar strategic priorities of the network 
flagship: Dell’s focus is on time compression in supply chain management and on rapid 
adjustment to changing customer requirements
19.  
 
                                                           
19 Within the same product market, HP’s different strategy priorities, especially its focus on innovation, 
gives rise to different network architectures. 
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We need to add a second level of complexity: most of the nodes of the GPN of a 
particular flagship, like Dell, simultaneously participate in multiple, other networks 
and/or act as flagships to other networks. For instance, a component supplier like Intel, 
one of the most powerful players in this industry, is the flagship of multiple specialized 
GPNs. Simultaneously, it participates in multiple other networks established by global 
brand leaders for digital computing, communication and consumer equipment and 
systems. 
 
Until recently, these fundamental changes in the organization of international production 
have been largely neglected in the literature, both in research on knowledge spill-overs 
through FDI, and in research on the internationalization of corporate R&D. This is now 
beginning to change. There is a growing acceptance in the literature that in order to 
capture the impact of globalization on industrial organization and upgrading, the focus of 
our analysis needs to shift away from the industry and the individual firm to the 
international dimension of business networks (for example, Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Ernst, 1997; Rugman and DґCruz, 2000; Birkinshaw 
and Hagstrшm, 2000; Borrus et al., 2000; Pavitt, 2002; Ernst and Ozawa, 2002). A focus 
on the evolution of cross-border corporate networks allows us to identify what is ‘new’ 
about the global network economy. 
 
Trade economists have recently discovered the importance of changes in the organization 
of international production as a determinant of trade patterns (for example, Feenstra, 
1998; Jones and Kierzskowski, 2000; Cheng and Kierzkowski, 2001). Their work 
demonstrates that (i) production is increasingly ‘fragmented’, with parts of the production 
process being scattered across a number of countries, hence increasing the share of trade 
in parts and components; (ii) that there is reintegration through global production 
networks; and (iii) that countries and regions which have been able to become a part of 
these network are the ones which have industrialized the fastest. And leading growth 
economists (for example, Grossman and Helpman, 2002) are basing their models on a 
systematic analysis of global sourcing strategies. 
 
Our model of GPNs builds on this work, but uses a broader concept that emphasizes three 
essential characteristics: i) scope: GPNs encompass all stages of the value chain, not just 
production; ii) asymmetry: flagships dominate control over network resources and 
decision-making
20; and iii) knowledge diffusion: the sharing of knowledge is the 
necessary glue that keeps these networks growing. 
 
A focus on international knowledge diffusion through an extension of firm organization 
across national boundaries distinguishes our concept of GPN from network theories 
developed by sociologists, economic geographers and innovation theorists that focus on 
localized, mostly inter-personal networks (for example, Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994). 
The central problem of these theories is that industries now operate in a global rather than 
a localized setting (Ernst et al., 2001). Important complementarities exist however with 
work on global commodity chains (GCC) (for example, Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). 
                                                           
20 See our discussion in 2.4. 
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A primary concern of the GCC literature has been to explore how different value chain 
stages in an industry (i.e. textiles) are dispersed across borders, and how the position of a 
particular location in such GCC affects its development potential through access to 
economic rents (for example, Gereffi and Kaplinsky, 2001; Henderson et al. 2001)
21. 
Strong complementarities also exist with research on computer-based flexible 
information infrastructures that frequently uses the terms ‘extended enterprise’ or ‘virtual 
enterprise’, where the first stands for more durable network arrangements, while the latter 
for very short-term ones (for example, Pedersen et al. 1999). 
 
By highlighting the dynamics of network evolution, our approach complements the 
transaction cost approach to networks and vertical disintegration, which centres on the 
presumed efficiency gains from these organizational choices (for example, Williamson, 
1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Our approach attempts to bring back into the analysis 
market structure and competitive dynamics, as well as the role played by knowledge and 
innovation.  
 
3.4. Digital information systems and knowledge diffusion 
There is a growing recognition in the literature on corporate networking practices that the 
increasing use of digital information systems (DIS) to manage these diverse networks 
may increase the mobility of knowledge. GPNs expand inter-firm linkages across 
national boundaries, increasing the need for knowledge diffusion, while DIS enhance not 
only information exchange, but also the sharing and joint creation of knowledge. 
 
Global corporations (the “network flagships”) construct these production networks to 
gain quick access to skills and capabilities at lower-cost overseas locations that 
complement their core competencies. Flagships need to transfer technical and managerial 
knowledge to local suppliers. This is necessary to upgrade the suppliers’ technical and 
managerial skills, so that they can meet the technical specifications of the flagships. 
Originally this involved primarily operational skills and routine procedures required for 
sales and distribution, manufacturing and logistics. Over time, knowledge sharing also 
incorporates higher-level, mostly tacit forms of “organizational knowledge” required for 
control, coordination, planning and decision-making, as well as for learning and 
innovation (Ernst and Kim, 2002).  
 
This new mobility of knowledge is made possible by important transformations in the use 
of DIS as a management tool. From a machine to automate transaction processing, the 
focus of DIS has shifted to the extraction of value from information resources, and then 
further to the establishment of Internet-enabled flexible information infrastructures that 
can support the extraction and exchange of knowledge across firm boundaries and 
national borders. A combination of economic and technological developments is 
responsible for this transformation. 
 
                                                           
21 Unfortunately, no one has as yet come up with a convincing and robust set of indicators. How should 
academic researchers, even with the best possible funding, be able to measure distribution of rents across 
borders, when global flagships like Enron and telecom majors excel in the development of sophisticated 
off-balance-sheet financial techniques and transfer pricing? 
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a) Economic drivers 
On the economic side, vertical specialization, particularly pronounced in the electronics 
industry, poses increasingly complex information requirements (e.g., Chen, 2002; 
Macher, Mowery and Simcoe, 2002). As firms now have to deal with constantly 
changing, large numbers of specialized suppliers, they need flexible and adaptive 
information systems to support these diverse linkages. These requirements became ever 
more demanding, as flagships attempt to integrate their dispersed production, knowledge 
and customer bases into global and regional networks. DIS now need to provide new 
means to improve global supply chain management and speed-to-market. DIS also need 
to provide for effective communication between design and manufacturing, and for the 
exchange of proprietary knowledge. The semiconductor industry provides examples for 
both developments: vertical specialization gives rise to the separation of design (“fabless 
design”) and manufacturing (“silicon foundry”). This creates very demanding 
requirements for knowledge exchange between multiple actors at distant locations, say a 
design house in Silicon Valley and a silicon foundry in Taiwan’s Hsinchuh Science Park. 
Vertical separation of design and production of semiconductor devices in turn has created 
a vibrant trade in “intellectual property rights” among specialized design firms that 
create, license and trade “design modules” for use in integrated circuits.   
 
In addition, far-reaching changes in work organization have fundamentally increased the 
requirements for information management and for the exchange of knowledge (e.g., 
Ciborra et al, 2000). The transition from Fordist “mass production” to “mass 
customization” requires a capacity to constantly adapt products or services to changing 
customer requirements, “sensing and responding” to individual customer needs in real 
time (Bradley and Nolan, 1998). This necessitates dynamic, interactive information 
systems, and a capacity to rapidly adjust the organization of firms and corporate networks 
to disruptive changes in markets and technology. Third, real-time resource allocation, 
performance monitoring and accounting became necessary, due to the short-term 
pressures of the financial system (quarterly reports) and due to the shortening life cycles 
of products and technologies. Fourth, to cope with ever more demanding competitive 
requirements, firms have to continuously adapt their organization and strategy, hence the 
demand for flexible DIS. 
b) Technology drivers 
On the technology side, the rapid development and diffusion of  cheaper and more 
powerful information and communication technologies (e.g., Sichel. 1997, and Flamm, 
1999) has considerably reduced transaction costs. In addition, the move towards more 
open standards in DIS architecture (UNIX, Linux, and HTML) and protocols (TCP/IP) 
enabled firms to integrate their existing intranets and extranets
22 on the Internet, which, 
by reducing cost and by multiplying connectivity, dramatically extended their reach 
across firm boundaries and national borders. 
 
                                                           
22 An “intranet” is defined as a private network contained within an organization (a firm) that consists of 
many inter-linked LANs (= local-area networks). Its main purpose is to share company information and 
computer resources among employees. An “extranet” in turn is a private network that links the flagship via 
conventional telecommunications networks with preferred suppliers, customers and strategic partners.  
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Compared to earlier generations of DIS, the Internet appears to provide much greater 
opportunities to share knowledge with a much greater number of people faster, more 
accurately, and in greater detail, even if they are not permanently co-located (Ernst, 2000, 
Lundvall and Smith book, Elgar). The most commonly used technologies today facilitate 
asynchronous interaction, such as e-mail or non-real time database sharing. But as data 
transfer capacity (“bandwidth”) increases, this is creating new opportunities for using 
technologies that facilitate synchronous interaction such as real-time data exchange, 
video-conferencing, as well as remote control of manufacturing processes, product 
quality and inventory, maintenance and repair, and even prototyping. This has created 
new opportunities for extending knowledge exchange across organizational and national 
boundaries, further magnifying the scope for vertical specialization. Equally important, 
wireless Internet-based technologies have increased the mobility of DIS. 
c) Impacts on knowledge diffusion 
The transition to Internet-based information systems can drastically accelerate speed-to-
market by reducing the time it takes to transmit, receive, and process routine business 
communications such as purchase orders, invoices, and shipping notifications. There is 
much greater scope for knowledge management: documents and technical drawings can 
be exchanged in real time, legally recognized signatures can be authenticated, browsers 
can be used to access the information systems of suppliers and customers, and 
transactions can be completed much more quickly. In addition, the Internet and related 
organizational innovations provide effective mechanisms for constructing flexible 
infrastructures that can link together and coordinate knowledge exchange between distant 
locations (Pedersen et al, 1999; Antonelli, 1992).  
 
The digitization of knowledge implies that it can be delivered as a service and built 
around open standards. This has fostered the specialization of knowledge creation, giving 
rise to a process of modularization, very much like earlier modularization processes in 
hardware manufacturing. In addition, there has been a gradual reduction of constraints to 
the exchange of tacit knowledge. Under the heading of “e-business”, a new generation of 
networking software provides a greater variety of tools for representing knowledge, 
including low-cost audio-visual representations (Foray and Steinmueller, 2001). Those 
programs also provide flexible information systems that support not only information 
exchange among dispersed network nodes, but also the sharing, utilization, and creation 
of knowledge among multiple network participants at remote locations (Jшrgensen and 
Kogstie, 2000). New forms of remote control are emerging for manufacturing processes, 
quality, supply chains, and customer relations. Equally important are new opportunities 
for the joint production across distant locations of knowledge support services (e.g., 
software engineering and development, business process outsourcing, maintenance and 
support of information systems, as well as skill transfer and training).  
 
While much of this is still at an early stage of “trial-and-error”, there is no doubt that the 
use of DIS to manage GPNs can enhance the sharing and joint creation of knowledge 
among multiple network participants at distant locations. This new mobility of 
knowledge provides new opportunities for Asian upgrading strategies in the electronics 
industry. 
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4. Asian Upgrading Strategies in the Electronics Industry 
Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries have implemented diverse upgrading 
strategies. The diversity of upgrading strategies reflects substantial differences in the 
product mix, as well as in the structure and development stage of the above electronics 
industries; it also reflects differences in the competitive dynamics across product 
markets. It would thus be a great mistake to assume that “one-size-fits-all” solutions can 
succeed: what works in one country will not necessarily work in another.  
 
To highlight the diversity of upgrading strategies, I address two questions: How do 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Asia’s first-tier newly industrializing economies) and 
Malaysia (a second-tier NIE) differ in their strategies to move beyond low-cost 
manufacturing? And, second, what are distinguishing features of China’s upgrading 
prospects as a “late-latecomer”? We conclude by highlighting some generic policy 
implications. 
 
4.1. Diverse strategies to  move beyond low-cost manufacturing 
A common feature of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia is that low-cost 
manufacturing based on cheap labor has run its course. This sets the above four countries 
apart from China. Manufacturing will of course remain an important source of economic 
growth. Yet, all of these four countries are keen to move beyond volume manufacturing. 
Obviously, this change in strategy has to occur gradually, with an initial focus on niche 
markets. Building on existing strengths in volume manufacturing, upgrading requires the 
development of new skills and capabilities in product design and development, as well as 
in “embedded” software, system-on-chip (SOC) design, IPR trade, system integration, 
and in the management of resources, supply chains and customer relations. Of particular 
importance is the development of knowledge-intensive support services that are essential 
for all four upgrading strategies. 
 
Important differences distinguish upgrading strategies in the above four countries that 
reflect historic differences in the development trajectories of their electronics industries. 
Korea’s electronics industry has focused on the mass production of a narrow mix of own-
brand-name consumer products and general-purpose high-precision components (like 
computer memories and displays). Taiwan’s strategy, on the other hand, has focused 
primarily on supplying global brand leaders through OEM (original equipment 
manufacturing) or ODM (original design manufacturing) contracts, with a focus of 
improving process specialization and efficiency. A third trajectory can be found in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Both countries have relied heavily on inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by global corporations that act as flagships of global production 
networks (GPNs). Singapore’s traditional role was to compete as a high quality, low-cost 
manufacturing base for GPNs, providing “a competitive and safe haven for 
manufacturing and a gateway to Asian markets.” (Economic Review Committee, 2002a: 
22). Malaysia has tried to reap as many benefits as possible from the fortuitous tailwind 
of FDI that swept into Southeast Asia since the late 1970s. The guiding principle has 
been “outward industrialization”, subordinated to the needs of Japanese, American and 
Taiwanese global network flagships, and focusing on low-end assembly operations.  
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(a) Malaysia
23 
In Malaysia, the Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) (Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry, 1996) signaled a fundamental change in the country’s industrialization 
strategy, away from assembly-based “outward industrialization” to value chain-based 
manufacturing, from sector-based to cluster-based development, and from performance 
targets to productivity-driven growth. The strategy is defined by two key concepts: 
“manufacturing ++” and “cluster-based development”. In line with Porter (1990), 
“manufacturing ++” highlights activities at both ends of the value chain, i.e. R&D and 
engineering, and in-bound logistics on the one hand, and outbound-logistics and sales & 
marketing, on the other hand. It is argued that a move into knowledge-intensive support 
services like product development, process engineering, supply chain management, and 
some select areas of R&D will enhance local value-added and productivity. “Cluster-
based development” implies that, based on existing strengths especially in components 
and semiconductors, developing a dense web of domestic linkages will enhance value -
added and deepen domestic capabilities. 
 
IMP2 highlights four specific objectives: i) foster the growth of leading local companies 
(Malaysian brands); ii) reduce dependence on input imports; iii) strengthen 
agglomeration economies by developing “Integrated Manufacturing Centers” (IMC) for 
global network flagships; and iv) develop cross-border clusters. Of these, the first two 
objectives are problematic, while the last two indicate a move in the right direction
24. 
Take recent developments in the Penang cluster where an attempt is made to combine the 
third and the fourth objective of the IMP2. Rather than just giving in to requests for 
improved incentives by foreign companies, the state government pursues a more selective 
approach: incentives are explicitly linked with the promotion of “integrated 
manufacturing centres” (IMC).The goal is to induce global flagships to move to Penang 
an “entire chain of operations for a particular product”. It is expected that this should 
enable the Penang cluster to upgrade from mere assembly and testing to knowledge 
support services, like sales and marketing, adaptive process engineering and tooling, 
financial planning, and, eventually parts of R&D like design and development (D&D).  
 
In short, with the Penang Skills Development Centre, with its second industrial master 
plan, and with the Bill of Guarantees (developed for its Multimedia Super Corridor), 
Malaysia has developed one of the most aggressive sets of upgrading incentives for 
private companies (both foreign and domestic)
25. And yet, despite such policies, low-end 
                                                           
23 Based on Ernst (2003, World Bank book, OUP) 
24 The first objective represents an outdated concept of industrial upgrading that assumes a fixed 
sequencing pattern from low-end, assembly-type subcontracting to “original brand name” (OBM) 
manufacturing (for a typical example, see Hobday, 1995). We now know that the transition to OBM is 
extremely difficult - even Taiwan´s Acer group has had only limited success (Ernst, 2000). The limited 
achievements of the “Proton City cluster” in automobiles also indicate that this objective may be 
unrealistic. As for the second objective, much depends on whether the country succeeds in finding the right 
balance between reaping the benefits of foreign input imports (as described in Rodrik, 1999) and the 
development of local backward and forward linkages. Hirschman (1956) in fact emphasizes the need to 
combine both effects. 
25 According to the Multimedia Development Corporation (2002), these incentives include commitments 
“to provide a world-class physical and information infrastructure; to allow unrestricted employment of 
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assembly operations continue to dominate. Most importantly, Malaysia has failed to 
develop a sufficiently diversified and deep industrial structure, to induce a critical mass 
of corporate investment in specialized skills and innovative capabilities. There is a 
growing recognition that lavish tax incentives and massive investment in infrastructure 
are insufficient to bring about the development of dynamic clusters. Recent strategic 
documents emphasize that the key to success are incessant efforts on a massive scale to 
continuously upgrade existing skills and capabilities, and to extend them into new areas 




Two peculiar features characterize the development of Singapore’s electronics industry: 
its heavy dependence on foreign investment, and one of the earliest attempts in Asia to 
move beyond low-cost manufacturing by “riding the waves” of competing American and 
Japanese GPNs (e.g., Wong, 2000). Government policies have focused on infrastructure 
support, manpower development and incentives to attract investments into higher value-
added manufacturing activities, “with scant regards for nationality of equity ownership.” 
(Wong et al, 1997).  
 
Equally important, the government has put in place a broad array of policies to promote 
the development of domestic small-and medium-sized enterprises in critical electronics 
supporting industries like plastic molding, metal stamping, tool and die making, precision 
parts and components, electroplating and finishing, mold making, jigs and fixtures, 
casting, printed circuit board assembly, and industrial automation equipment. An 
important institutional innovation has been the establishment, in 1986, of the Local 
Industry Upgrading Program (LUP), administered by the Economic Development Board 
(EDB) to forge closer ties between local enterprises and global network flagships, 
thereby exposing local enterprises to leading-edge management procedures and 
technological knowledge (EDB, 1993). Recently, Singapore has amended this policy with 
a new program to promote local information service suppliers, called “Infocomm Local 
Industry Upgrading Programme” (iLIUP). A typical example is the iLIUP partnership 
agreements that link Software AG, the German vendor of XML  (=extensible markup 
languge) software, with specialized Singaporean solution providers
26 to develop 
customized XML-based business solutions for foreign affiliates and Asian companies. To 
make this network work, Software AG has brought in a global supplier of training 
programs for XML and related technologies, called Genovate Solutions. The latter 
                                                                                                                                                                             
local and foreign knowledge workers; to ensure freedom of ownership by exempting companies with MSC 
Status from local ownership requirements; to give the freedom to source capital globally for MSC 
infrastructure, and the right to borrow funds globally; to provide competitive financial incentives, including 
Pioneer Status (100 percent tax exemption) for up to ten years, or an investment tax allowance for up to 
five years, and no duties on the importation of multimedia equipment; to become a regional leader in 
Intellectual Property Protection and Cyberlaws; to ensure no censorship on the Internet; to provide globally 
competitive telecommunications tariffs; to tender key infrastructure contracts to leading companies willing 
to use the MSC as their regional hub; and to provide a high-powered implementation agency to act as an 
effective one-stop super shop.” 
26 These Singaporean solution suppliers focus on enterprise resource planning (ERP), system management, 
network security, network knowledge management and a variety of Internet-based application services. 
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company is responsible for establishing and running an XML Academy in Singapore that 
serves the Asia-Pacific region, training enterprises and individuals on XML, SAP, Java, 
Oracle, Linux, Web Logic and other enterprise software programs. 
 
In addition, the Singapore Government, through its investment arm Temasek Holdings, 
has attempted to develop innovative domestic electronics firms that would be strong 
enough to compete globally. Temasek for instance invested heavily in the growth of 
companies such as Chartered Semiconductor (for silicon foundry services) and Singapore 
Technologies Assembly & Test Services (STAT, for the assembly and testing of 
integrated circuits). However, this strategy does not seem to be working. Chartered has 
been performing badly. Chartered, ranked a distant third behind Taiwan TSMC and UMC 
in the global market for made-to-order chips, has had its nineth straight quarterly loss as 
of 31 March 2003. The government is now considering whether Temasek should exit the 
business. 
 
As part of a systematic review of earlier policies, the government has recently formed a 
high-level Economic Review Committee that brings together senior executives of global 
corporations, government planners, venture capitalists, and academics, to design effective 
strategies for value creation through innovation. The Sub-Committee on Manufacturing 
that is chaired by the Chairman and CEO of Philips Electronics Asia-Pacific, has 
identified the following objectives for Singapore’s upgrading strategy in the electronics 
industry. First, to develop unique “system integration” capabilities in a few key sectors 
(primarily storage and semiconductors), where Singapore should “host the entire value 
chain of activities from R&D, applications development and ‘test bedding’, to (the) 
development of new markets.” (Economic Review Committee, 2002a: p.24). Second, for 
innovation to blossom, it needs close interaction with manufacturing. It is suggested to 
deepen the division of labor between Singapore (for knowledge-intensive activities) and 




Third, it is suggested to build specialized and flexible (“plug-and-play”) infrastructures 
for the country’s key electronics clusters. In the semiconductor industry, for instance, the 
development of shared facilities would enable all participants (i.e. wafer fabs, assembly 
lines, vendors of materials and production equipment, etc) to reduce their individual cost 
burden of externalities. The ERC report specifically identifies shared utilities, chemicals, 
gases and waste treatment for gas and water. Fourth, equally important are concerted 
efforts to complement domestic innovative capabilities with international knowledge 
sourcing. By definition, Singapore’s domestic innovative capabilities are bound to remain 
                                                           
27 It is argued for instance that global contract manufacturers, like Flextronics, may want to use Singapore 
as a regional hub to carry out product design (ODM) and rapid prototyping of system products such as 
computers and storage devices. “At the same time, they can use the Riau islands as a low-cost yet nearby 
location for labour-intensive manufacturing, to be managed and/or supported out of Singapore. “ 
(Economic Review Committee, 2002a: p.26). This requires massive investments to improve logistics for 
movements of goods; to improve movement of commuters (technical staff based in Singapore to support 
Riau operations); to develop local support industries in Riau; and provide welfare and goodwill that is 
necessary for sustaining political stability (Economic Review Committee, 2002b) 
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limited. Recruitment of expatriates with scarce specialized skills provides an important 
leverage for accelerating domestic learning.  Bringing in foreign skills also helps to 
constrain the growth of wages
28.  
 
International knowledge sourcing however also involves the public sector, and attempts 
to create new forms of collaboration between public research institutes and global 
corporate R&D organizations. Specifically, it is suggested that public research institutes 
“should try and cooperate with corporate R&D organizations overseas and leverage 
Intellectual Property assets to attract these companies to innovate in Singapore.” 
(Economic Review Committee, 2002a: p.13). 
 
c. Korea 
In response to the traumatic impact of the 1997 financial crisis, Korea’s mix of upgrading 
strategies suggest a radical break with the pre-crisis development model of its electronics 
industry. From a chaebol-dominated industry structure, characterized by octopus-like 
diversification into ever-new markets for mass-produced commodities (Ernst, 1994), a 
new system is proposed that is characterized by four building-blocks (interviews in 
Korea, September 2002):  
 
•  let thousands of “new technology-based firms” blossom; 
•  develop a broad set of capabilities for chip and system-on-chip design 
•  spearhead and test-bed new mobile Internet applications; and 
•  become a leading platform and contents developer. 
 
To implement this ambitious strategy, the government has pushed through a set of high-
priority policies that encompass, inter alia: 
 
•  a serious attempt to restructure the vertically integrated chaebol system; 
•  a massive effort, personally backed by the President
29, to establish leading-edge 
information infrastructures and network systems across the country, to transform 
various government services using information systems, and to encourage firms to 
adopt Internet-based information systems; 
•  multiple initiatives to support the development of electronic design capabilities, such 
as the establishment of an ASIC Design Support Center, an Integrated Circuit Design 
Education Center (IDEC), a System IC 2010 Project, and, backed by a $ 20 million 
government grant, an Inter-University System-on-Chip Campus (coordinated by 
Seoul National University), where related university institutes all over the country 
can join in curricula design and in the exchange of credits. 
 
                                                           
28 The ERC report contains the following blunt statement: “During rapid upswings, the Government should 
consider raising the ceiling of foreigners allowed to work in the country to avoid wage inflation. “ 
(Economic Review Committee, 2002a: pages 13, 14). 
29 The new Korean President Roh Moo-hyun shares this commitment with the former president Kim Dae-
jun. The appointment of the former CEO of Samsung Electronics as the new minister of information and 
communications signals an aggressive policy to expand the country’s infrastructure and capabilities.  
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Of particular importance are two developments that highlight the systemic nature of 
Korea’s upgrading strategies. First, major building blocks of a sector-specific innovation 
system for electronic design (especially system-on-chip design) have been jointly 
developed by the government, public research institutions and private firms. This has 
strengthened the relationship between foundry firms, system firms and IP providers, 
creating a potentially significant market for test-bed applications in digital consumer 
electronics and communications. Second, Korean firms and public research labs have 
accumulated considerable capabilities to develop complex technology systems like TDX 
(a switching system) and CDMA-based communication systems. It is expected that these 
experiences in the development of large IT systems may provide the basis for developing 
a robust electronic design industry. 
 
However, questions have recently been raised about the quality of results, and about 
necessary adjustments. For instance, changes in industry structure turned out differently 
than expected. While a few chaebol like Daewoo have been effectively dismantled, 
Korea’s electronics industry continues to be dominated by a few oligopolists, i.e. 
Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom, Korea Telecom, and LG. Despite massive efforts 
through government-backed incubators and venture capital, to create a large pool of 
innovative start-up firms, only very few such firms have survived, primarily those that 
are linked to the “New Big Four”. Equally important, the usage patterns of wireless 
Internet in Korea is skewed towards games, while communication (email), e-business 
applications, and research play only a marginal role (Yi, 2002: p.62). This raises doubts 
whether the Korean mobile Internet market can serve as a test-bed for major innovations. 
Only time will tell to what degree these “revisionist” views on Korea’s upgrading 
prospects are influencing the strategies of Korean firms and government policies. 
 
(d) Taiwan 
In contrast to Korea, Taiwan was less affected by the 1997 financial crisis. Taiwanese 
electronics firms traditionally entered as “fast followers” during the growth stage of a 
particular product market - a strategy that was highly successful until recently. A key 
success factor was a capacity to combine low-cost production and quick response to 
changes in markets and technology (Ernst, 2000). Low-cost production was made 
possible by rigorous cost control management and the establishment of a low-cost supply 
base in China and Southeast Asia. Quick response relied on a flexible system of supplier 
networks characterized by temporary “spider web” arrangements that are assembled for 
the duration of a particular project, and then dissolved. 
 
However, the downturn in the global electronics industry since late 2000 has exposed 
serious drawbacks of Taiwan’s “fast follower” strategy: razor-thin profit margins are 
insufficient to support investment in R&D; high licensing costs constrain diversification 
into new product markets with higher profit margins; a limited accumulated portfolio of 
patents, despite rapid growth in U.S. patent filings; and an exposure to increasingly 
severe hollowing-out pressures, as more and more manufacturing and related support 
services are moving to lower-cost locations in China and Southeast Asia. 
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Taiwan has responded with a set of coordinated upgrading strategies (interviews in 
taiwan, November 2002): improvements are simultaneously pursued in product mix, 
process specialization, information management and product development and design. 
Three major inter-related objectives define Taiwan’s approach to upgrading: First, to 
strengthen Taiwan’s market position as an OEM and ODM supplier to global brand 
leaders against competition from global U.S.-based contract manufacturers. Second, to 
develop a broad set of capabilities in electronic design and especially system-on-chip 
(SOC) design. And, third, to create value through global brands, intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and de facto industry standards. 
 
The first objective requires a combination of parallel upgrading moves that encompass: 
 
•  diversification moves into new product markets, like mobile communication products 
(e.g., cellular phones, W-LAN) and digital consumer electronics (e.g., digital video 
and audio systems); 
•  significant improvements in process specialization and information management; 
•  an extension and deepening of regional production networks in China, moving from 
sourcing of parts and components towards verification of manufacturing processes, 
engineering support, as well as software development and basic research; 
•  improvements in process technology (e.g. nano-technology) to upgrade 
manufacturing operations in Taiwan; and 
•   enhanced capabilities in product development and design. 
 
 
This brings us to the second objective. It is argued that, without strong capabilities in 
electronic and especially system-on-chip (SOC) design, it is impossible to achieve the 
first and the third upgrading objectives. Furthermore, in light of Taiwan’s global 
leadership in foundry services, as well as in chip assembly & testing
30, there are now 
realistic possibilities to develop world-class Taiwanese competitors in fabless chip 
design. SOC design is perceived to be “the next battleground” for the global 
semiconductor industry (Lo, 2002). This reflects the increasingly demanding 
performance requirements of mass-market electronic systems (e.g., notebooks, hand-held 
PCs, PDAs, mobile phones, digital video systems): they all need to become lighter, 
thinner, shorter, smaller, multi-functional, power-saving, inexpensive, and faster. By 
integrating the whole system on a single piece of silicon, SOC design is expected to cope 
with these increasingly complex requirements. Specifically, SOC design is expected to 
shorten design cycle time, increasing the success rate of IC development, and to enhance 
the competitiveness and market share of the brand name companies that sell these 
systems. 
 
                                                           
30 With the two world leaders, TSMC and UMC, Taiwan’s foundry industry accounts for 73% of 
worldwide foundry revenues; its chip assembly and testing firms account for about one third of worldwide 
revenues. 
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To support the development of Taiwan’s SOC design industry, the government has 
initiated a “National SOC Research Program”, coordinated by the National Chiao Tung 
University in Hsinchu Science Park that consists of three components: 
 
•  training & research: the Ministry of Education is committed to recruit each year 
additional 85 specialized SOC teaching faculty over the next three years; and the 
National Science Council will fund SOC graduate research programs; 
•  development of core SOC technologies for wireless and optoelectronic  systems, and 
for embedded processors; and 
•  establishment of a Global SOC Design and Service Park  to attract leading global 
industry players, by providing them with quick and easy access to foundries, 
assembly & test services, design services, and a so-called “IP mall” that facilitates the 
exchange of design building blocks, the so-called IPR trade  (intellectual property 
rights). 
 
The third objective, i.e. the creation of global brands, IPRs and de facto industry 
standards, is the core of Taiwan’s upgrading strategy. It critically depends on success 
with the second objective. And it is supposed to gain in importance over time, relative to 
the first objective. The underlying assumption is that leading Taiwanese electronics firms 
are now strong enough to pursue “technology leadership” strategies, at least in carefully 
chosen market segments. Timing is of critical importance: this strategy will only work if  
the company succeeds in setting de facto industry standards early in a new product’s life 
cycle. This explains why quantitative increases in R&D/sales ratios and in U.S. patent 
filings alone are considered to be insufficient. Apart from the creation of more “basic” 
patents, the key to success are specialized management capabilities required for strategic 
marketing, global branding strategies and the negotiation of de facto standard alliances. 
 
To implement these objectives, industrial policy has been organized as an interactive 
exercise, a “policy dialogue” among multiple participants (both national and foreign) in 
Tawain’s electronics production and innovation networks. This policy dialogue 
originated from a variety of institutional arrangements that were designed to overcome 
through “collective action” the disadvantages of small size that initially characterized 
Taiwan’s electronics firms (Ernst, 2000, APJM).  These arrangements included R&D 
consortia, joint development of key components, and institutions for the provision of 
quasi- public goods (standardization, testing and certification, training, information 
sharing, knowledge exchange, joint marketing and brand recognition campaigns).  
 
Taiwan’s policy dialogue brings together a broad range of participants, including 
industrial planning agencies, state-owned development banks and investment funds, 
private venture capital, major Taiwanese electronics companies, affiliates of foreign 
firms, start-up companies, public research organizations, university research centers, 
foreign consultants, as well as the overseas Taiwanese science and engineering and 
business communities in the US, Japan, China and Europe. Over time, these individual 
and often ad hoc linkages and dialogues have been transformed into institutionalized 
mechanisms for consultation and coordination. This has enabled the Taiwanese 
government to engage the private sector in a national effort of identifying trajectories of 
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technological diffusion and innovation, entry strategies and priorities for state action. The 
institutionalization of the industrial policy dialogue has also served as a locus of 
coordinating joint R&D activities and collaborative business strategies.  
 
This policy dialogue operates on four levels (Table 8: Taiwan’s Industrial Policy 
Dialogue - Multi-Level Strategic Decision-Making), moving from consensus-building 
on long-term vision down to the implementation and evaluation of specific projects. The 
key to this very important institutional innovation is that it allows for a high degree of 
resourcefulness and versatility in mobilizing multiple upgrading actors and their 
resources, as well as in soliciting policy contributions from outside the state apparatus 
and from outside Taiwan’s borders.  
 
The last aspect is of particular importance. There is a clear understanding that, as a small 
and politically isolated economy, Taiwan needs to rely on international linkages. The 
focus of these linkages however now moves from integration into global production 
networks to international knowledge sourcing. The following mechanisms of 
international knowledge sourcing are increasingly perceived as critical:  close interaction 
with Taiwan’s vast informal networks of overseas R&D engineers and managers in the 
electronics industry; participation in international R&D alliances and standard consortia; 
incentives for global corporations to establish R&D activities in Taiwan; the recruitment 
of top foreign engineers and researchers through attractive value-share bonus systems; 
collaborative R&D projects with leading global centers of excellence; and collaborative 
R&D projects with leading research labs and universities in China.   
 
4.2. China’s upgrading options as a “late-latecomer” 
China’s specific challenge results from the fact that it enters the electronics industry as a 
“late-latecomer”. The scope for repeating earlier “easy” entry strategies is much more 
limited. For instance, offshore chip assembly, which, based on the availability of cheap 
labor, provided growth benefits to Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia during the 1970s and 
1980s, since then has become highly automated and requires a capital-intensive and 
sophisticated infrastructure. In addition, key sectors of the electronics industry are now 
dominated by a small group of global players from the US, Japan, Europe, as well as 
from Korea and Taiwan. In this sense, upgrading in China faces more demanding 
requirements.  
 
Nevertheless, China’s late-latecomer status also conveys competitive advantages that 
explain the country’s new attractiveness for inward FDI. As described in section 2.3., 
China’s upgrading strategies can build on a unique combination of  five advantages that 
comprise a booming market for electronics products and services, the world’s largest 
pool of low-cost specialized and easily re-trainable IT skills; a reasonably well developed 
domestic base of technological and innovative capabilities, and support policies pursued 
by the central government, as well as regional and local authorities to rely on GPNs as an 
accelerator of industrial upgrading. It is in this context that China can use as an initial 
“cash cow” strategy its vast cheap labor pool to muscle its entry into the low-end of the 
industry.  
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However, there is a broad consensus in China that simply creating cheap-labor 
manufacturing jobs is not a viable development strategy. If the country would passively 
rely on FDI, without complementary domestic support policies, it is unlikely that 
substantial upgrading would occur. A good proxy is the low labor productivity of   
foreign-invested enterprises in China (UNCTAD, 2003). Measured as the value added in 
US-dollars divided by the number of employees, labor productivity is lowest in China 
among the main Asian FDI destinations. It is $7,199 per employee in China, $ 22,940 in 
Malaysia, and $ 97,193 in Taiwan
31. 
 
China’s innovation policy is driven by three interrelated objectives (e.g., Einhorn, 2003; 
Naugthon and Seagal, 2001; Dahlman and Aubert, 2001). The first objective is to reduce 
the technology gap with Japan, Korea and Taiwan, to improve the country’s appalling 
productivity record. A second objective is to use innovation to create new and better 
paying jobs through innovation, in order to reduce the potentially high social costs of 
massive industrial restructuring imposed by WTO membership
32. A third objective is to 
strengthen the Chinese military by developing open software (Linux)-based command, 
control and communications software, as well as sophisticated avionics and naval 
electronics
33. Finally, a fourth objective is to generate revenues through lower-price 
cloning of complex technology systems (like switching systems), and to generate rents by 
defining global standards. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, China’s government has initiated various programs to strengthen 
the country’s innovative capabilities, and the electronics industry has been a priority 
target for such programs. It took some time however to develop appropriate institutional 
arrangements (e.g., Liu and White, 2002). Initially, these programs focused on public 
research institutions (the 863 program
34) and state-owned enterprises (the 1988 Torch 
Plan), combined with selective partnering with a handful of preferred global 
corporations. The 1988 Torch Plan was meant to develop China’s innovative capabilities 
in high-tech industries, primarily electronics, focusing especially on R&D and the 
commercialization of new technologies in state-owned enterprises. The Torch Plan also 
included the creation of so-called high-tech industrial parks all over the country. 
Successful examples are the high-tech parks established in Beijing (Zhongguancun, close 
to Beijing University and Qinghua University), Shanghai (ZhangJiang Hi-Tech Park), 
Suzhou (Suzhou Industrial Park), and Hangzhou (close to Zhejiang University). 
 
Despite some achievements, the Torch Plan had major draw-backs (Naughton and Segal, 
2002: pages 14 -15): many firms that entered the high-tech parks, primarily were 
                                                           
31 Note that for domestic firms, China’s comparative position is even worse. Labor productivity in China is 
$ 2,633 per employee in China, against $ 13,923 in Malaysia, and $ 20,533 in Taiwan. 
32 Recent estimates of these costs can be found in Takeuchi, 2003, and Sano, 2003. 
33 This objective has recently gained in prominence, in response to the new US preemptive military strike 
doctrine. 
34 The 863 program (so named, because it was established in March 1986) brings together researchers from 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, other public research institutes and university labs on cross-disciplinary 
projects like computer-integrated manufacturing systems. Enterprises have not been involved in project 
selection or implementation. 
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interested in reaping the benefits of preferential tax incentives and export subsidies, 
without developing new technologies. Much of the program funding, furthermore went to 
state-owned enterprises, rather than to innovative private start-up companies. Finally, 
selective partnering with a handful of global corporations did not produce the expected 
improvement in domestic innovative capabilities. 
 
This gave rise, since the early 1990s to a drastic revision of China’s upgrading strategy in 
the electronics industry. An important element was the decision to open the floodgates 
for inward FDI from diverse sources, signaled by Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” in 
1992. Since then, a heavy reliance on FDI sets China’s electronics industry apart from its 
counterparts in Japan, Korea and even Taiwan. This made it possible to exploit multiple 
competing foreign technology sources to enhance knowledge diffusion to Chinese firms, 
increasingly also to non-state technology enterprises. At the same time, aggressive 
domestic industrial and innovation policies enabled domestic electronics firms to grow 
and compete. The government encouraged domestic computer companies like Legend, a 
non-state spin-off from the Institute of Computing Technology of the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences (Lu Qiwen, 2000), or telecommunications equipment producers like Huawei, 
Datang or ZTE, to engage in international knowledge sourcing through joint ventures 
with foreign technology leaders and through participation in GPNs. The process of 
“opening-up” has culminated in China’s WTO accession. Some observers feared that the 
resultant liberalization of trade and investment regimes would crowd out domestic firms, 
and that it would weaken China’s capacity to support its electronics industry (e.g., Nolan, 
2001, chapter 11). But thus far, there is little evidence of substantial constraining effects 
on upgrading strategies. 
 
Five basic propositions inform China’s emerging new upgrading strategy in the 
electronics industry. First, as a late-latecomer, China has to develop its own idiosyncratic 
approach to policies, support institutions and business strategies. The experiences of 
other countries, in Asia, but also in the US and Europe, can provide important insights. In 
the end, China has to come up with its own solutions, based on its own peculiar strengths 
and weaknesses. But, being a late-latecomer, also conveys important advantages. Low 
labor costs is one such advantage. But equally important is that China is less burdened 
with outdated digital information and communications systems than earlier latecomers 
like Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Of particular importance is the limited role played by 
“legacy” operating systems and standards. For instance, as China lags behind in its 
installed Internet infrastructure, it is free to push for a rapid transition of Internet 
hardware and software known as Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPV6). This distinguishes 
China from other countries, but especially from the US that would need to displace a lot 
of existing infrastructure and computer and network software. If China goes ahead and 
deploys IPV6 first, it could be the first country “to write the new software while the rest 
of the world plays catch-up.” (senior AT&T software executive, quoted in Einhorn, 2003, 
p.80) 
 
Second, given the rapid pace of change in the global electronics industry structure, 
upgrading the country’s electronics industry involves multiple moving targets, hence 
solutions have to be constantly adjusted. Of critical importance is the choice of 
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appropriate sequencing patterns for developing innovative capabilities. In some cases, 
this may necessitate a reversal of established sequencing patterns. As illustrated by the 
case of Legend, China’s broad-based science and technology system makes it possible to 
start from service-centered product development and (re)-design, and then to move 
backwards via marketing to manufacturing. Equally important is a sufficient degree of 
flexibility in policies and institutions that allow for quick response and adjustments to 
abrupt changes in markets and technology, and to unexpected outcomes of upgrading 
policies. 
 
Third, in light of its potentially insatiable market for electronic products and services, 
China has good chances to pursue a portfolio of concurrent upgrading strategies that 
combine selective knowledge sourcing with value creation through innovation. Take the 
development of China’s chip design industry. Leading global specialized suppliers are 
well established now in Asia across all stages of the semiconductor value chain, from 
assembly and test, to wafer fabrication, design tools, and different stages of ED. For 
China, this opens up new opportunities to develop domestic design capabilities. For 
instance, the government has established two national multi-project wafer (MPW) service 
centers (one in Beijing, and one in Shanghai) that provide access to foundries and 
assembly companies, both from Taiwan (for sophisticated design rules) and from China. 
And seven government-supported Research Centers for Integrated Circuit Design  (in 
Shanghai, Beijing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Hangzhou, Xi’an, and Chendu) provide a variety of 
knowledge-intensive services, including subsidized access to leading-edge EDA tools, 
that help to overcome constraints that individual Chinese design houses face when trying 
to transform their designs into silicon. 
 
The real issue however is to gain design-ins with electronic system companies with 
products that face high-growth markets. China provides ample opportunities. There is a 
clear understanding that it would be unrealistic, at this stage, to try to compete in high-
end IPs, like microprocessors. It is realistic however to develop design capabilities for 
IPs (especially for embedded processors) for the potentially huge domestic markets in 
consumer electronics and telecommunications equipment. The more design-ins can be 
gained in these sectors, the greater the chances of success for China’s attempts to create 
alternative, so-called “non-standard” standards like EVD, TD-SCMA, Chinese language 
Linux-based operating systems and alternative designs to Cisco routers
35. 
 
Fourth, there is a recognition in the relevant decision-making circles of existing 
weaknesses. There is also a fairly good understanding of the entry barriers and the risks 
involved in aggressive upgrading strategies. There is a huge gap in innovative 
capabilities. For instance, China’s total R&D spending is about $ 11billion, compared to 
more than $233 billion for the US. In terms of their accumulated capabilities, even the 
best Chinese companies are way behind global Asian industry leaders like Sony, 
Samsung, Acer, Honhai, let alone Microsoft, IBM or Intel. The portfolio of commercially 
proven IPRs is still very limited, and China’s position in software remains weak
36. Other 
                                                           
35 See earlier discussion in section 3.1. 
36 Chinese software exports in 2001 were a meager $ 720 million, mostly lower-end programming work for 
US global corporations. Note however that the government projects software exports to rise to $ 5 billion 
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widely discussed weaknesses include: the absence of efficient capital markets, especially 
for venture capital, which raises the barriers for new innovative start-up companies; the 
lack of global brand recognition, which is extremely costly and time-consuming to build; 
and a continuous brain drain, even during the current China boom
37.  
 
There are intense debates about the appropriate pace of China’s upgrading efforts. Those 
who argue for a cautious approach point to research on earlier experiences in Asia which 
has shown that it takes a long time to build a broad set of productive capabilities and 
related basic and intermediate innovative capabilities (e.g., Ariffin, 2002). Research and 
Taiwan and Korea shows that it takes even longer to move from there to high-end 
innovative capabilities and research capabilities (e.g., Kim, 1997; Ernst, 1994 and 2000, 
APJM). But proponents of a more aggressive strategy argue that the starting-point is 
different in China, as it has already a reasonably strong and broad-based set of innovative 
and research capabilities. The main issue in this view is how quickly and effectively 
these capabilities can be linked with and integrated into corporate innovation strategies 
pursued by SOEs and private electronics companies. 
 
Fifth, and finally, there is a clear understanding that domestic efforts need to be 
complemented by multiple international linkages. Such linkages are considered to play an 
important catalytic role in facilitating and accelerating the upgrading of China’s 
electronics industry. The focus however is moving away from an earlier heavy reliance 
on technological capabilities developed within affiliates of global flagships, and their 
eventual spill-overs into local firms. Also, earlier attempts (especially in the car industry) 
to trade market access in exchange for access to technology are widely considered to 
work no longer. There is a growing consensus that China needs to enhance international 
knowledge sourcing through linkages with foreign universities, research institutes, and 
consulting firms, and by tapping into the vast informal global peer group networks of 
overseas Chinese researchers, engineers and managers. These diverse international 
linkages can help Chinese electronics firms to bridge existing gaps in specialized skills 
and innovative capabilities; and they can facilitate changes in organization and 
procedures that are necessary to develop these capabilities locally. 
 
4.3. Generic policy suggestions 
Our analysis of Asian upgrading strategies in the electronics industry shows that creating 
pathways to innovation requires a very active involvement of the state (i.e. local, 
regional, and central government agencies, as well as a variety of intermediate 
institutions). But this involvement now takes on a very different form from earlier top-
down “command economy” type industrial policies. It also differs from the “New 
Economy” liberalization doctrine.
 
Traditional Asian “developmental” policies are no longer feasible. With their top-down 
approach, controlled investment finance, and reliance on SOEs or chaebol, these policies 
                                                                                                                                                                             
by 2005. There are now well-funded programs to train software engineers, and to develop higher-level 
capabilities, especially in encryption and security programs. 
37 “America is sucking away all the best and the brightest in China” (Andy Xie, managing director of 
Morgan Stanley in Hong Kong, quoted in “High tech in China”, Business Week, 28 October 2002) 
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are too rigid to cope with complex challenges and opportunities of the global network 
economy that have been explored in this paper. These policies also cannot cope with the 
conflicting needs of multiple and increasingly vocal domestic actors. In addition, 
traditional developmental policies are unable to cope with the high uncertainty and rapid 
changes in technology and markets that are typical for the electronics industry. Finally, in 
light of their protectionist focus, these policies are unlikely to generate and benefit from 
international knowledge linkages that, as we have seen, are of critical importance for 
pathways to innovation in the global network economy. 
 
Neither can the “New Economy” liberalization doctrine cope with the new opportunities 
and challenges for Asian electronics industries that we have examined in this paper. This 
doctrine claims that, except for education, infrastructure and a few general incentives (for 
training and R&D), the state should get out of the way, and let transnational technical and 
venture capital communities make the necessary investments in innovative capabilities 
(e.g., Bresnahan, Gambardella and Saxenian, 2001). But there are two problems with this 
concept.  
 
First, none of our countries has used this approach, and it is simply misleading to claim 
(as Bresnahan, Gambardella and Saxenian, 2001 do) that Taiwan has used such an 
approach. Taiwan’s upgrading strategies in the electronics industry have gone through 
two different phases: from “late follower” to “fast follower”; and from “fast follower” to 
“technology leader”. And throughout all these stages, the state did play an important role 
(Hsueh, Hsu and Perkins,2001; “Reengineering the Developmental State..”, The China 
Review, March 1, 2002; Ernst, 2000, APJM). Our analysis of taiwan’s upgrading 
strategies in the electronics industry confirms the renewed importance of the state. 
 
A second even more serious problem with the “New Economy” doctrine is that it 
neglects the dramatic fall of that economy (Ernst, 2001, Economia e Politica Industriale). 
So deeply entrenched is that belief that it has survived the worst recession in the history 
of key sectors of the “New Economy” (especially telecommunications and computers). 
This is ironic in light of the fact that in the US, and especially on Wall Street and in 
Silicon Valley, the debate has moved on. The emerging consensus is that the concept of 
the “New Economy” is buried under a long list of unfulfilled promises. Alice Rivlin, a 
former vice chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve, and a co-author of a major study of the 
productivity effects of the Internet (Litan and Rivlin, 2001), argues that much of the 
“New Economy” propositions are “hopes and hunches” (quoted in the Financial Times, 
September 3, 2001, p.2). Even more ironic is that the US government certainly does not 
do what the proponents of the “New Economy” doctrine claim it does. Driven by national 
security concerns and by fears of loosing its technological leadership, the Federal 
government spends $ 2 billion a year on information technology research, coordinated 
through a variety of agencies including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DAPRA) which has played a prominent role in the development of the US computer and 
internet industry (Flamm, 1987; Naughton, 1999). 
 
In light of the substantial challenges and barriers faced by Asian electronics exporting 
countries in their attempts to upgrade their electronics industries, there is no doubt that 
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the state has to play an important role in these efforts. However, what worked in the past 
does not work any longer. Instead, new approaches to innovation policy are required that: 
 
•  strengthen the state’s steering & coordination capacity; 
•  provide public goods/created assets (infrastructure; bottleneck skills; training & 
education);  
•  facilitate access to and diffusion of knowledge; balance this with the need to protect 
intellectual property rights (IPRs);  
•  encourage innovations in the financial sector;  
•  generate dialogues at various levels among multiple participants (local & foreign) in 
production and innovation networks;  
•  foster inter-active learning & innovation;  
•  provide social protection and retraining options for the losers of innovation;  
•  and facilitate international knowledge sourcing through corporate networks, 
institutional collaboration, and through diverse social networks (global peer group 
communities and expatriates). 
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Table 1. Electronics Production and Markets: 
Top Countries, 2002*, $M(% share of total)
1,253,059 1,247,896 Total
14,525 (1.2) 39,216 (3.1) Malaysia
21,889 (1.7) 39,916 (3.2) Singapore
22.950 (1.8) 43,699 (3.5) Taiwan
59,649 (4.5) 49,013 (3.9) Germany
39,713 (3.2) 69,861 (5.6) Korea
105,064 (8.4) 110,613 (8.9) China
194.005 (15.5) 231,984 (18.6) Japan
380,004 (30.3) 318,890 (25.6) USA
Markets Production
Source: own calculations, based on Yearbook of World Electronics Data 2002/2003, June 2002
*= figures are forecasts at 2000 constant values & exchange rates (inflation is not included) lanc 03  
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Table 2: Wafer Fabrication Moves to Asia 
(quote latest figures from VLSI Research, in Semiconductor reporter) 
 




Table 3.  Taiwan’s Top Electronics Products (2001): Ranking No.1
59.6 5,115 K 374 12. ADSL Modem
27.2 480.24 60% 5,710 K 29.5 482 13. Wireless LAN
66 35,783 K 305.7 10. Ethernet LAN card
74.8 41,868 K 228.6 11. HUB
58% 8,700K 9. PC Camera















38.4 2,158 39.2 6,035 K 41.1 2,308 5. LCD Monitor
23.4 11,362 49 12,532 K  23.9 11,594 4. Notebook PC
14.6 1,097 8774 million 30.4 2,285 3. IC Package
48 140 million 56.7 400 2. Mask ROM
72.9 6,070 1. Foundry
Production Value Production Volume Export Value
lanc 03  
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Table 4. Asian Trade Specialization Profiles: RCA and Leading Export Products 
 
Country     Product              RCA              Share in Electronics exports (%) 
 
   '93  '94 '95  '96 '97  '98  '93 '94  '95  '96  '97  '98 
Korea  EDP  0.9  0.8 0.8  0.9 0.9  0.7 14.4 11.9 12.2 14.5 15.5 13.9 
 Storage  0.2  0.3 0.4  0.7 1.3 1.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.8 4.1 4.1 
 COMP  2.4  2.7 2.8  2.7 2.8  2.7 50.1 56.2 62.4 60.8 62.3 63.4 
 SC  3.3  3.8 4.1  3.6 4.0  3.8 30.4 37.2 45.7 40.3 42.9 45.3 
 Cons.  Electronics  2.3  2.4 2.0  2.0 1.7  1.5 22.5 20.5 16.1 15.6 12.8 12.7 
 Telecom  0.9  0.9 0.8  0.8 0.6 0.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.9 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
28.0  29.7 30.9  28.8 29.2  28.3         
Taiwan  EDP  2.5  2.7 3.0  3.4     39.4 39.0 41.6 45.0  44.62  45.29 
 Storage  0.3  0.3 0.5  0.6     0.8 0.6 1.0 1.3  2.10  1.97 
 COMP  1.9  2.0 2.1  2.2     37.2 39.3 41.6 40.2  41.93  40.86 
 SC  1.6  1.8 2.0  2.2     13.7 16.8 20.4 19.6  22.05  21.77 
 Cons.  Electronics  1.4  1.5 1.2  1.1     12.9 12.0 8.5 6.8  6.42  5.98 
 Telecom  1.7  1.7 1.6  1.6     4.9 4.8 4.1 4.0  3.59  4.20 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
29.5  31.0 34.3  35.8           
Singapore  EDP  4.6  5.1 5.1  5.4 5.5  5.2 40.7 38.6 39.4 42.8 44.1 44.6 
 Storage  12.9  13.4 12.8  15.3 12.4 11.4 17.6 15.7 16.0 18.8 19.3 19.8 
 COMP  2.7  3.4 3.4  3.6 3.7  3.7 29.4 35.4 38.5 38.0 38.9 40.7 
 SC  3.2  4.0 4.2  4.5 4.8  5.0 15.7 19.4 23.8 23.9 25.0 27.4 
 Cons.  Electronics  3.1  3.2 2.9  2.9 2.3  1.7 15.9 13.7 11.6 10.4  8.7  6.8 
 Telecom  1.1  1.2 1.1  0.8 0.7 0.6 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
53.0  58.8 60.7  60.7 60.6  61.4         
Malaysia  EDP  1.4  1.8 2.0  2.3 2.9  3.0 13.8 15.6 17.1 20.5 25.3 27.4 
 Storage  0.0  0.1 0.8  0.2 3.7 4.1 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.3 6.3 7.6 
 COMP  3.7  3.7 3.6  3.8 3.9  3.9 44.6 42.6 43.9 44.6 45.1 45.7 
 SC  5.6  5.2 4.7  4.9 5.3  5.2 30.5 28.3 29.8 29.3 30.1 30.7 
 Cons.  Electronics  4.2  5.0 5.1  5.0 4.1  3.5 24.2 24.2 22.6 20.1 16.5 15.1 
 Telecom  2.1  2.4 2.0  2.0 1.7 1.5 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.8 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
47.6  52.5 54.9  54.7 55.8  57.5         
Thailand  EDP  1.4  1.8 1.9  2.4 2.5    32.2 34.0 36.8 41.4 40.9   
 Storage  2.8  5.4 4.6  4.5 2.0    9.8 15.5 14.0 11.9  6.2   
 COMP  1.4  1.5 1.5  1.6 1.6    38.4 38.8 39.9 36.5 35.8   
 SC  1.7  1.6 1.4  1.6 1.7    20.8 19.3 19.5 18.8 18.3   
 Cons.  Electronics  1.3  1.6 1.4  1.5 1.7    16.7 16.4 13.3 12.0 13.1   
 Telecom  1.2  1.1 1.0  1.2 1.2    5.2 3.9 3.7 4.1 3.9   
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
20.8  24.0 24.9  28.4 29.6          
Source:   UN Trade Data Base Comtrade 




Table 5.  Vertical Specialization in the Electronics Industry













dealers    retail chain          VAR              BTO
















• multiple market segments
• shifting order







•d i s k



























































a = system specification
b = process technology
c = design implementation
d = fabrication
e = packaging & testing
f  = materials & mfg equipment
lanc 03
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Fig. 1  Widening Design Productivity Gap 
in Integrated Circuits
1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
(Source: SIA, 1999) lanc 03
Moore’s Law (K Logic Transistors per Chip)



















































*= including salary, benefits, equipment, office space and other infrastructure.
Sources: PMC-Sierra Inc, Burnaby, Canada (for Silicon Valley, Canada, Ireland, India); 
plus interviews (Taiwan, South Korea, China)



























































































Physical flows, including products and services





























Table 8.  Taiwan’s Industrial Policy Dialogue – Multi-Level 
Strategic Decision-Making
IDB commissions appropriate 
research units within GRI’s to 
coordinate R&D consortia with 
domestic producers
evaluate product-specific or 
firm-specific projects
IV. Implementation




•S W O T
• measures to be taken by specific 









• bi-annual review of three 
industry lists:









• annual STAG meetings
• NSTC (every 5 years)
• NII Steering Committee
• technology road maps & 
markets
• socio-economic implications
• desirable industry profile
• role of government
I. Consensus on 
Long-Term Vision
Institutions Tasks Levels
lanc 03  
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